We introduce the framework of qualitative optimization problems (or, simply, optimization problems) to represent preference theories. The formalism uses separate modules to describe the space of outcomes to be compared (the generator) and the preferences on outcomes (the selector). We consider two types of optimization problems. They differ in the way the generator, which we model by a propositional theory, is interpreted: by the standard propositional logic semantics, and by the equilibrium-model (answer-set) semantics. Under the latter interpretation of generators, optimization problems directly generalize answer-set optimization programs proposed previously. We study strong equivalence of optimization problems, which guarantees their interchangeability within any larger context. We characterize several versions of strong equivalence obtained by restricting the class of optimization problems that can be used as extensions and establish the complexity of associated reasoning tasks. Understanding strong equivalence is essential for modular representation of optimization problems and rewriting techniques to simplify them without changing their inherent properties.
Introduction
We introduce the framework of qualitative optimization problems in which, following the design of answer-set optimization (ASO) programs (Brewka, Niemelä, and Truszczyński 2003) , we use separate modules to describe the space of outcomes to be compared (the generator) and the preferences on the outcomes (the selector). In all optimization problems we consider, the selector module follows the syntax and the semantics of preference modules in ASO programs, and the generator is given by a propositional theory. If this propositional theory is interpreted according to the standard propositional logic semantics, that is, outcomes to be compared are models of the generator, we speak about the classical optimization problems (CO problems, for short). If the generator theory is interpreted by the semantics of equilibrium models (Pearce 1997), also known as answer sets (Ferraris 2005) , that is, it is the answer sets of the generator that are being compared, we speak about answer-set optimization problems (ASO problems, for short).
Representing and reasoning about preferences in qualitative settings is an important research area for knowledge representation and qualitative decision theory. The main objectives are to design expressive yet intuitive languages to model preferences, and to develop automated methods to reason about formal representations of preferences in these languages. The literature on the subject of preferences is vast. We refer the reader to the special issue of Artificial Intelligence Magazine (Goldsmith and Junker 2008) for a collection of overview articles and references.
Understanding when optimization problems are equivalent, in particular, when one can be interchanged with another within any larger context, is fundamental to any preference formalism. Speaking informally, optimization problems P and Q are interchangeable or strongly equivalent when for every optimization problem R (context), P ∪ R and Q ∪ R define the same optimal models. Understanding when one optimization problem is equivalent to another in this sense is essential for preference analysis, modular preference representation, and rewriting techniques to simplify optimization problems into forms more amenable to processing, without changing any of their inherent properties. Let us consider a multi-agent setting, in which agents combine their preferences on some set of alternatives with the goal of identifying optimal ones. Can one agent in the ensemble be replaced with another so that the set of optimal alternatives is unaffected not only now, but also under any extension of the ensemble in the future? Strong equivalence of agents' optimization problems is precisely what is needed to guarantee this full interchangeability property! The notion of strong equivalence is of general interest, by no means restricted to preference formalisms. In some cases, most notably for classical logic, it coincides with equivalence, the property of having the same models. However, if the semantics is not monotone, that is, extending the theory may introduce new models, not only eliminate some, strong equivalence becomes a strictly stronger concept, and the one to adopt if theories being analyzed are to be placed within a larger context. The nonmonotonicity of the semantics is the salient feature of nonmonotonic logics (Marek and Truszczyński 1993) and strong equivalence of theories in nonmonotonic logics, especially logic programming with the answer-set semantics (Gelfond and Lifschitz 1991) , was extensively studied in that setting (Lifschitz, Pearce, and Valverde 2001; Turner 2003; Eiter, Fink, and Woltran 2007) . Preference formalisms also often behave nonmonotonically as adding a new preference may cause a non-optimal outcome (model) to become an optimal one. Thus, in preference formalisms, equivalence and strong equivalence are typically different notions. Accordingly, strong equivalence was studied for logic programs with rule preferences (Faber and Konczak 2006) , programs with ordered disjunction (Faber, Tompits, and Woltran 2008) and programs with weak constraints (Eiter et al. 2007 ).
We extend the study of strong equivalence to the formalism of qualitative optimization problems. The formalism is motivated by the design of answer-set optimization (ASO) programs of Brewka, Niemelä, and Truszczyński (2003) . It borrows two key features from ASO programs that make it an attractive alternative to the preference modeling approaches based on logic programming that we mentioned above. First, following ASO programs, optimization problems provide a clear separation of hard constraints, which specify the space of feasible outcomes, and preferences (soft constraints) that impose a preference ordering on feasible outcomes. Second, optimization problems adopt the syntax and the semantics of preference rules of ASO programs that correspond closely to linguistic patterns of simple conditional preferences used by humans.
The separation of preference modules from hardconstraints facilitates eliciting and representing preferences. It is also important for characterizing strong equivalence. When a clear separation is not present, like in logic programs with ordered disjunctions, strong equivalence characterizations are cumbersome as they have to account for complex and mostly implicit interactions between hard constraints and preferences. For optimization problems, which impose the separation, we have "one-dimensional" forms of strong equivalence, in which only hard constraints or only preferences are added. These "one-dimensional" concepts are easier to study yet provide enough information to construct characterizations for the general case. Main Contributions. (1) We propose a general framework of qualitative optimization problems, extending in several ways the formalism of ASO programs. We focus on two important instantiations of the framework, the classes of classical optimization (CO) problems and answer-set optimization (ASO) problems. The latter one directly generalizes ASO programs. (2) We characterize the concept of strong equivalence of optimization problems relative to changing selector modules. The characterization is independent of the semantics of generators and so, applies both to CO and ASP problems. We also characterize strong equivalence relative to changing generators (with preferences fixed). In this case, not surprisingly, the characterization depends on the semantics of generators. However, we show that the dependence is quite uniform, and involves a characterization of strong equivalence of generators relative to their underlying semantics, when they are considered on their own as propositional theories. Finally, we combine the characterizations of the "one-dimensional" concepts of strong equivalence into a characterization of the general "combined" notion. (3) We develop our results for the case when preferences are ranked. In practice, preferences are commonly ranked due to the hierarchical structure of preference providers. The general case we study allows for additions of preferences of ranks from a specified interval [i, j] . This covers the case when only some segment in the hierarchy of preference providers is allowed to add preferences (top decision makers, middle management, low-level designers), as well as the case when there is no distinction between the importance of preferences (the non-ranked case). (4) We establish the complexity of deciding whether two optimization problems are strongly equivalent relative to changing selectors, generators, or both. We present only proof sketches and some of the simpler and not overly technical proofs in the main text. Detailed proofs can be found in the Appendix.
Optimization Problems
A qualitative optimization problem (an optimization problem, from now on) is an ordered pair P = (T, S), where T is called the generator and S the selector. The role of the generator is to specify the family of outcomes to be compared. The role of the selector S is to define a relation ≥ on the set of outcomes and, consequently, define the notion of an optimal outcome. The relation ≥ induces relations > and ≈: we define I > J if I ≥ J and J ≥ I, and I ≈ J if I ≥ J and J ≥ I. For an optimization problem P , we write P g and P s to refer to its generator and selector, respectively.
Generators. As generators we use propositional theories in the language determined by a fixed countable universe U, a boolean constant ⊥, and boolean connectives ∧, ∨ and →, and where we define the constant ⊤, and the connectives ¬ and ↔ in the usual way. 1 Models of the generator, as defined by the semantics used, represent outcomes of the corresponding optimization problem. We consider two quite different semantics for generators: the classical propositional logic semantics and the semantics of equilibrium models (Pearce 1997). Thus, outcomes are either models or equilibrium models, depending on the semantics chosen. The first semantics is of interest due to the fundamental role and widespread use of classical propositional logic, in particular, as a means to describe constraints. Equilibrium models generalize answer sets of logic programs to the case of arbitrary propositional theories (Pearce 1997; Ferraris 2005) and are often referred to as answer sets. The semantics of equilibrium models is important due to the demonstrated effectiveness of logic programming with the semantics of answer sets for knowledge representation applications. We use the terms equilibrium models and answer sets interchangeably.
Throughout the paper, we represent interpretations of U as subsets of U. We write I |= φ to state that an interpretation I ⊆ U is a (classical propositional) model of a formula φ. Furthermore, we denote the set of classical models of a formula or theory T by Mod (T ).
Equilibrium models arise in the context of the propositional logic of here-and-there, or the logic HT for short (Heyting 1930) . We briefly recall here definitions of concepts, as well as properties of the logic HT that are directly relevant to our work. We refer to the papers by Pearce (1997) and Ferraris (2005) for further details.
The logic HT is a logic located between the intuitionistic and the classical logics. Interpretations in the logic HT are pairs I, J of standard propositional interpretations such that I ⊆ J. We write I, J |= HT φ to denote that a formula φ holds in an interpretation I, J in the logic HT. The relation |= HT is defined recursively as follows: for an atom a, I, J |= HT a if and only if a ∈ I. The cases of the boolean connectives ∧ and ∨ are standard, and I, J |= HT ϕ → ψ if and only if J |= ϕ → ψ (classical satisfiability) and I, J |= HT ϕ or I, J |= HT ψ. Finally, I, J |= HT ⊥.
An equilibrium model or answer set of a propositional theory T is a standard interpretation I such that I, I |= HT T and for every proper subset J of I, J, I |= HT T . Answer sets of a propositional theory T are also classical models of T . The converse is not true in general.
We denote the set of all answer sets of a theory T by AS (T ), and the set of all HT-models of T by Mod
For each of the semantics there are two natural concepts of equivalence. Two theories T 1 and T 2 are equivalent if they have the same models (classical or equilibrium, respectively). They are strongly equivalent if for every theory S, T 1 ∪ S and T 2 ∪ S have the same models (again, classical or equilibrium, respectively).
For classical semantics, strong equivalence and equivalence coincide.
It is not so for the semantics of equilibrium models.
The result by Lifschitz, Pearce, and Valverde (2001) states that two theories T 1 and T 2 are strongly equivalent for equilibrium models if and only if T 1 and T 2 are equivalent in the logic HT, that is Mod HT (T 1 ) = Mod HT (T 2 ).
We call optimization problems under the classical interpretation of generators classical optimization problems or CO problems, for short. When we use the answer-set semantics for generators, we speak about answer-set optimization problems or ASO problems, for short.
Selectors.
We follow the definitions of preference modules in ASO programs (Brewka, Niemelä, and Truszczyński 2003) , adjusting the terminology to our more general setting. A selector is a finite set of ranked preference rules
where k and j are positive integers, and φ i , 1 ≤ i ≤ k, and ψ are propositional formulas over U. For a rule r of the form (1), the number j is the rank of r, denoted by rank (r), hd (r) = {φ 1 , . . . , φ k } is the head of r and ψ is the body of r, bd (r). Moreover, we write hd i (r) to refer to formula φ i . If rank (r) = 1 for every preference rule r in a selector S, then S is a simple selector. Otherwise, S is ranked. We often omit "1" from the notation " 1 ←" for simple selectors. For a selector S, and i, j ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .} ∪ {∞}, we define
≤ j} (where we assume that for every integer k, k < ∞) and write [i, j] for the rank interval {k | i ≤ k ≤ j}. We extend this notation to optimization problems. For P = (T, S) and a rank interval [i, j], we set P [i,j] = (T, S [i,j] ). For some rank intervals we use shorthands, for example
, and similar.
For an interpretation I, a satisfaction degree of a preference rule r is v I (r) = min{i | I |= hd i (r)}, if I |= bd (r) and I |= hd (r); otherwise, the rule is irrelevant to I, and v I (r) = 1. We note that Brewka, Niemelä, and Truszczyński (2003) represented the satisfaction degree of an irrelevant rule by a special nonnumeric degree, treated as being equivalent to 1. The difference is immaterial and the two approaches are equivalent.
Selectors determine a preference relation on interpretations. Given interpretations I and J and a simple selector S, I ≥ S J holds precisely when for all r ∈ S, v I (r) ≤ v J (r). Therefore, I > S J holds if and only if I ≥ S J and there exists r ∈ S such that v I (r) < v J (r); I ≈ S J if and only if for every r ∈ S, v I (r) = v J (r).
Given a ranked selector S, we define I ≥ S J if for every preference rule r ∈ S, v I (r) = v J (r), or if there is a rule r ′ ∈ S such that the following three conditions hold:
2. for every r ∈ S of the same rank as r
3. for every r ∈ S of smaller rank than r ′ , v I (r) = v J (r).
Moreover, I > S J if and only if there is a rule r ′ for which the three conditions above hold, and I ≈ S J if and only if for every r ∈ S, v I (r) = v J (r). Given an optimization problem P = (T, S) we often write ≥ P for ≥ S (and similarly for > and ≈). Optimal (preferred) outcomes. For an optimization problem P , µ(P ) denotes the set of all outcomes of P , that is, the set of all models (under the selected semantics) of the generator of P . Thus, µ(P ) stands for all models of P in the framework of CO problems and for all answer sets of P , when ASO problems are considered. A model I ∈ µ(P ) is optimal or preferred for P if there is no model J ∈ µ(P ) such that J > P I. We denote the set of all preferred models of P by π(P ). Relation to ASO programs.
Optimization problems extend the formalism of ASO programs (Brewka, Niemelä, and Truszczyński 2003) in several ways. First, the generator programs are arbitrary propositional theories. Under the semantics of equilibrium models, our generators properly extend logic programs with the answer-set semantics used as generators in ASO programs. Second, the selectors use arbitrary propositional formulas for options in the heads of preference rule, as well as for conditions in their bodies. Finally, optimization problems explicitly allow for alternative semantics of generators, a possibility mentioned but not pursued by Brewka, Niemelä, and Truszczyński (2003) . Notions of Equivalence. We define the union of optimization problems as expected, that is, for P 1 = (T 1 , S 1 ) and P 2 = (T 2 , S 2 ), we set P 1 ∪ P 2 = (T 1 ∪ T 2 , S 1 ∪ S 2 ).
Two optimization problems P 1 and P 2 are strongly equivalent with respect to a class R of optimization problems (contexts) if for every optimization problem R ∈ R, π(P 1 ∪R) = π(P 2 ∪ R).
We consider three general classes of contexts. First and foremost, we are interested in the class L U of all optimization problems over U. We also consider the families L g U and L s U of all optimization problems of the form (T, ∅) and (∅, S), respectively. The first class consists of optimization problems where all models of the generator are equally preferred. We call such optimization problems generator problems. The second class consists of optimization problems in which every interpretation of U is an acceptable outcome. We call such optimization problems selector problems. These "one-dimensional" contexts provide essential insights into the general case. For the first class, we simply speak of strong equivalence, denoted ≡ s g . For the latter two classes, we speak of strong gen-equivalence, denoted ≡ g , and strong sel-equivalence, denoted ≡ s , respectively. Constraining ranks of rules in selectors gives rise to two additional classes of contexts parameterized using rank intervals [i, j]:
The first class of contexts gives rise to strong selequivalence with respect to rules of rank in [i, j] , denoted by ≡ s, [i,j] . The second class of contexts yields the concept of strong equivalence with respect to rules of rank in
Examples
We present now examples that illustrate key issues relevant to strong equivalence of optimization problems. They point to the necessity of some conditions that appear later in characterizations of strong equivalence and hint at some constructions used in proofs. In all examples except for the last one, we consider simple CO problems. In all problems only atoms explicitly listed matter, so we disregard all others.
Example 1 Let P 1 = (T 1 , S 1 ), where T 1 = {a ↔ ¬b} and S 1 = {a > b ←}. There are two outcomes here, {a} and {b}, that is, µ(P 1 ) = {{a}, {b}}. Let r be the only preference rule in S 1 . Clearly, v {a} (r) = 1 and v {b} (r) = 2. Thus, {a} > P1 {b} and so, π(P 1 ) = {{a}}. In addition, let P 2 = (T 2 , S 1 ), where T 2 = {a ∧ ¬b} and S 1 is as above. Then, µ(P 1 ) = {{a}} and, trivially, π(P 1 ) = {{a}}. It follows that P 1 and P 2 are equivalent, as they specify the same optimal outcomes. However, they are not strongly gen-equivalent (and so, also not strongly equivalent). Indeed, let R = ({¬a}, ∅). Then µ(P 1 ∪ R) = {{b}} and so, π(P 1 ∪ R) = {{b}}. On the other hand, µ(P 2 ∪ R) = ∅ and, therefore, π(P 2 ∪ R) = ∅.
Example 1 suggests that we must have µ(P 1 ) = µ(P 2 ) if problems P 1 and P 2 are to be strongly (gen-)equivalent. Otherwise, by properly selecting the context generator, we can eliminate all outcomes in one problem still leaving some in the other.
Example 2 Let
We have µ(P 3 ) = {{a}, {b}, {c}}. In addition, {a} > P3 {b}, {a} > P3 {c}, and {b} and {c} are incomparable. Thus, π(P 3 ) = {{a}}. Let now P 4 = (T 4 , S 4 ), where T 4 = T 3 and S 4 = {a > b > c ←}. Clearly, µ(P 4 ) = µ(P 3 ) = {{a}, {b}, {c}}. Moreover, {a} > P4 {b} > P4 {c}. Thus, π(P 4 ) = {{a}} and so, P 3 and P 4 are equivalent. They are not strongly (gen-)equivalent. Indeed, let R = ({¬a}, ∅). Then, π(P 3 ∪R) = {{b}, {c}} and that π(P 4 ∪R) = {{b}}.
This example suggests that for two optimization problems to be strongly (gen-)equivalent, they have to define the same preference relation > on outcomes.
Example 3 Let P 5 = (T 5 , S 5 ), where T 5 = {a, ¬b} and S 5 = ∅. We have µ(P 5 ) = {{a}} and so, π(P 5 ) = {{a}}. It follows that P 5 is equivalent to
and so, µ(P 1 ∪ R) = µ(P 1 ) = {{a}, {b}}) and we get π(P 1 ∪ R) = {{a}, {b}}. Thus, P 5 and P 1 are not strongly (sel-)equivalent.
Informally, this example shows that by modifying the selector part, we can make non-optimal outcomes optimal. Thus, as in the case of strong gen-equivalence (Example 1) the equality of sets of models (i.e., equivalence) is important for strong (sel-)equivalence (a more refined condition will be needed for ranked programs, as we show in Theorem 2).
Example 4
For the next example, let us consider problems P 6 = (T 1 , S 6 ) and P 7 = (T 1 , S 7 ), where T 1 is the generator from Example 1, S 6 = {a > b ←, b > a ←} and S 7 = ∅. We have µ(P 6 ) = µ(P 7 ) = {{a}, {b}}. Moreover, {a} ≥ P6 {b} and {b} ≥ P6 {a}. Thus, π(P 6 ) = {{a}, {b}}. Since P s 7 = ∅, we also have (trivially) that {a} ≈ P7 {b}. Thus, π(P 7 ) = {{a}, {b}}, too, and the problems P 6 and P 7 are equivalent. They are not strongly sel-equivalent, though. Let R = (∅, {a > b ←}). Then, P 6 ∪ R = P 6 and so, π(P 6 ∪ R) = {{a}, {b}}. On the other hand, {a} > P7∪R {b}. Thus, π(P 7 ∪ R) = {{a}}.
The example suggests that for strong sel-equivalence the equality of the relation ≥ induced by the problems considered is important. The equality of the relation > is not sufficient. In our example, the relations > P6 and > P7 are both empty and so -equal. But they are empty for different reasons, absence of preference versus conflicting preferences, which can give rise to different preferred models when extending selectors.
Our last example involves ranked problems. It is meant to hint at issues that arise when ranked problems are considered. In the general case of ranked selectors, the equality of the relation > induced by programs being evaluated is not related to strong sel-equivalence in any direct way and an appropriate modification of that requirement has to be used together with yet another condition (cf. Theorem 2). 
Example 5 Let
P = (T 1 , S), where S = {a > b 2 ←} and P ′ = (T 1 , S ′ ), where S ′ = {a > b 3 ←}. Clearly, µ(P ) = µ(P ′ ) = {{a}, {b}} and π(P ) = π(P ′ ) = {a}.
Strong sel-equivalence
We start with the case of strong sel-equivalence, the core case for our study. Indeed, characterizations of strong selequivalence naturally imply characterizations for the general case thanks to the following simple observation.
Proposition 1 Let P and Q be optimization problems (either under classical or answer-set semantics for the generators) and
Furthermore, the set of outcomes of an optimization problem P is unaffected by changes in the selector module. It follows that the choice of the semantics for generators does not matter for characterizations of strong sel-equivalence. Thus, whenever in this section we refer to the set of outcomes of an optimization problem P , we use the notation µ(P ), and not the more specific one, Mod (P g ) or AS (P g ), that applies to CO and ASO problems, respectively.
Our first main result concerns strong sel-equivalence relative to selectors consisting of preference rules of ranks in a rank interval [i, j] . Special cases for strong sel-equivalence will follow as corollaries. To state the result, we need some auxiliary notation. For an optimization problem P , we define diff P (I, J) to be the largest k such that I ≈ P <k J. If for every k we have I ≈ P <k J, then we set diff
and a relation ≻ over 2 U , we write ≻ V for the restriction of
Theorem 2 For every ranked optimization problems P and Q, and every rank interval [i, j], P ≡ s, [i,j] Q if and only if the following conditions hold:
We now comment on this characterization and derive some of its consequences. First, we observe that the conditions (1) and (2) are indeed necessary -differences be-
whose addition to P and Q results in problems with different sets of optimal outcomes. This is illustrated by Examples 3 and 4 in the case of simple problems and simple contexts (i = j = 1), where π(P <i ) and π(Q <i ) coincide with µ(P ) and µ(Q), respectively. The condition (3) is necessary, too. Intuitively, if the first ranks where P and Q differentiate between two outcomes I and J (which are optimal for ranks less than i) are not equal, these first ranks must both be larger than j. Otherwise, one can find a selector with rules of ranks in [i, j] , that will make one of the interpretation optimal in one extended problem but not in the other.
Next, we discuss some special cases of the characterization. First, we consider the case i = 1, which allows for a simplification of Theorem 2. Corollary 3 For every ranked optimization problems P and Q, and every rank interval [1, j], P ≡ s, [1,j] Q if and only if the following conditions hold:
Proof. Starting from Theorem 2, we note that the selector of P <1 is empty and hence π(P <1 ) = µ(P ). Moreover, if the precondition i < diff P (I, J) and i < diff Q (I, J) in condition (3) of Theorem 2 is not satisfied for i = 1 and a pair I, J ∈ µ(P ), then diff P (I, J) = 1 and diff Q (I, J) = 1 and thus the consequent is satisfied in that case as well, which allows for omitting the precondition. ✷ If in addition j = ∞, we obtain the case of rankunrestricted selector contexts, and condition (3) can be simplified once more, since diff P (I, J) > j and diff Q (I, J) > j never hold for j = ∞.
Corollary 4 For every optimization problems
if and only if the following conditions hold:
Next, we note that if an optimization problem is simple then diff P (I, J) > 1 if and only if diff P (I, J) = ∞, which is equivalent to I ≈ P J. This observation leads to the following characterization of strong sel-equivalence of simple optimization problems.
Corollary 5 For every two simple optimization problems P and Q, the following statements are equivalent: (2) and (3) of that corollary. Indeed, let us consider I, J ∈ µ(P ) such that I ≥ P J and distinguish two cases. If (i) diff P (I, J) = 1 then I > P J and by condition (2) of Corollary 3, also I >
Since P, Q are simple, I ≈ Q J, and consequently I ≥ Q J. By symmetry, we also have that
. Thus, the conditions (1) and (2) of Corollary 4 follow. To prove the condition (3), let us first assume diff P (I, J) > 1 for I, J ∈ µ(P ). It follows that diff P (I, J) = ∞ and thus I ≈ P µ(P ) J. By our earlier observation also I ≈ Q µ(Q) J and thus diff Q (I, J) = ∞.
In the last remaining case, diff P (I, J) = 1 and diff Q (I, J) = 1, so we directly obtain
Corollary 5 shows, in particular, that for simple problems there is no difference between the relations ≡ s,≥1 and ≡ s,=1 . This property reflects the role of preference rules of rank 2 and higher. They allow us to break ties among optimal outcomes, as defined by preference rules of rank 1. Thus, they can eliminate some of these outcomes from the family of optimal ones, but they cannot introduce new optimal outcomes. Therefore, they do not affect strong selequivalence of simple problems. This property has the following generalization to ranked optimization problems.
Corollary 6 Let P and Q be ranked optimization problems and let k be the maximum rank of a preference rule in P ∪Q. Then the relations ≡ s,≥k and ≡ s,=k coincide.
Proof. Clearly, P ≡ s,≥k Q implies P ≡ s,=k Q. Thus, it is enough to prove that if P ≡ s,=k Q then P ≡ s,≥k Q. To prove the condition (3), let us consider I, J ∈ π(P <k ) such that diff P (I, J) > k. By the condition (3) of Theorem 2, diff Q (I, J) > k. Since k is the maximum rank of a preference rule in P or Q, diff P (I, J) = ∞ and
Our observation on the role of preference rules with ranks higher than ranks of rules in P or Q also implies that P and Q are strongly sel-equivalent relative to selectors consisting exclusively of such rules if and only if P and Q are equivalent (have the same optimal outcomes), and if optimal outcomes that "tie" in P also "tie" in Q and conversely. Formally, we have the following result.
Corollary 7 Let P and Q be ranked optimization problems and let k be the maximum rank of a preference rule in P ∪ Q. Then P ≡ s,≥k+1 Q if and only if π(P ) = π(Q) and
Proof. Clearly, P <k+1 = P and Q <k+1 = Q and so, π(P <k+1 ) = π(P ) and π(Q <k+1 ) = π(Q). Thus, the "only-if" part follows by Theorem 2 (the condition (1) of that theorem reduces to π(P ) = π(Q) and the condition (3) implies ≈ P π(P ) =≈ Q π(Q) ). To prove the "if" part, we note that the condition (1) of Theorem 2 holds by the assumption. Moreover, the relations > P π(P ) and > Q π(Q) are empty and so, they coincide. Thus, the condition (2) of Theorem 2 holds. Finally, if I, J ∈ π(P ), and diff P (I, J) > k + 1, then diff P (I, J) = ∞ and so, I ≈ P J. By the assumption,
Thus, the condition (3) of Theorem 2 holds, too, and P ≡ s,≥k+1 Q follows. ✷ Lastly, we give some simple examples illustrating how our results can be used to "safely" modify or simplify optimization problems, that is rewrite one into another strongly sel-equivalent one.
Regarding these problems as CO problems, we have that µ(P ) = µ(P ′ ) = {{a}, {b}, {c}}. Moreover, it is evident that ≥ Next, for an example of a more general principle, we note that removing preference rules with only one option in the head yields a problem that is strongly sel-equivalent. Proof. The conditions (1)- (3) of Theorem 2 all follow from an observation that for every interpretation I and every preference rule r with just one option in the head, v I (r) = 1. ✷
Strong gen-equivalence
We now focus on the case of strong gen-equivalence. The semantics of generators makes a difference here but the difference concerns only the fact that under the two semantics we consider, the concepts of strong equivalence are different. Other aspects of the characterizations are the same. Specifically, generators have to be strongly equivalent relative to a selected semantics. Indeed, if the generators are not strongly equivalent, one can extend them uniformly so that after the extension one problem has a single outcome, which is then trivially an optimal one, too, while the other one has no outcomes and so, no optimal ones. Second, the preference relation > defined by the selectors of the problems considered must coincide. Thus, a single theorem handles both types of problems.
Theorem 9 For every two CO (ASO, respectively) problems P and Q, P ≡ g Q if and only if
In view of Examples 1 and 2, the result is not unexpected. The two examples demonstrated that the conditions of the characterization cannot, in general, be weakened.
It is clear from Corollary 4 and Theorem 9 that strong selequivalence of CO problems is a stronger property than their strong gen-equivalence.
Corollary 10 For every two CO problems
In general the implication in Corollary 10 cannot be reversed. The problems P 6 and P 7 considered in Example 4 are not strongly sel-equivalent. However, based on Theorem 9, they are strongly gen-equivalent. Indeed, Mod (P The relation between strong sel-equivalence and strong gen-equivalence of ASO problem is more complex. In general, neither property implies the other even if both problems P and Q are assumed to be simple. It is so because P ≡ s Q if and only if AS(P g ) = AS(Q g ) and
(Corollary 5), and P ≡ g Q if and only of Mod
Strong equivalence -the combined case
Finally, we consider the relation ≡ s g , which results from considering contexts that combine both generators and selectors. Since generators may vary here, as in the previous section, the semantics of generators matters. But, as in the previous section, the difference boils down to different characterizations of strong equivalence of generators.
We start with a result characterizing strong equivalence of CO and ASO problems relative to combined contexts (both generators and selectors possibly non-empty) with selectors consisting of rules of rank at least i and at most j, respectively.
Theorem 11 For every ranked CO (ASO, respectively) problems P and Q, and every rank interval
Q if and only if the following conditions hold:
) for CO problems, and
) . The corresponding characterizations for CO and ASO problems differ only in their respective conditions (1), which now reflect different conditions guaranteeing strong equivalence of generators under the classical and answer-set semantics. Moreover, the four conditions of Theorem 11 can be obtained by suitably combining and extending the conditions of Theorem 2 and Theorem 9. First, as combined strong equivalence implies strong gen-equivalence, the condition (1) is taken from Theorem 9. Second, we modify the conditions (2) and (3) from Theorem 2 replacing π(P <i ) with Mod (P g ) (and accordingly π(Q <i ) with Mod (Q g )), as each classical model of P g can give rise to an optimal classical or equilibrium one upon the addition of a context, an aspect also already visible in Theorem 9. Finally, we have to add a new condition that the relations > P<i and > Q<i coincide on the sets of models of P g and Q g . When generators are allowed to be extended, one can make any two of their models to be the only outcomes after the extension. If the two outcomes, say I and J, are related differently by the corresponding strict relations induced by rules with ranks less than i, then in one extended problem, exactly one of the two outcomes, say I, is optimal. In the other extended problem we cannot have both outcomes be optimal nor J only be optimal as that would contradict the strong equivalence of problems under considerations. If, however, I is the only optimal outcome also in the other extended problem, then I must "win" with J based on rules that have ranks at least j. In such case, there is a way to add new preferences of rank i that will "promote" J to be optimal too, without making it optimal in the first problem. However, that contradicts strong equivalence.
We conclude this section with observations concerning the relation ≡ s g for both CO and ASO problems. The contexts relevant here may contain preference rules of arbitrary ranks. We start with the case of CO problems, where the results are stronger. While they can be derived from the general theorems above, we will present here arguments relying on results from previous sections, which is possible since for CO problems equivalence and strong-equivalence of generators coincide.
We saw in the last section that for CO problems ≡ s is a strictly stronger relation than ≡ g . In fact, for CO problems, ≡ s coincides with the general relation ≡ s g .
Theorem 12
For every CO problems P and Q, P ≡ s g Q if and only if P ≡ s Q.
Proof. The "only-if" implication is evident. To prove the converse implication, we will use Proposition 1 which reduces checking for strong equivalence to checking for strong sel-equivalence. Let R ∈ L g U be a generator problem. Since P ≡ s Q, from Corollary 4 we have 
Corollary 14
For every simple ASO problems P and Q, the following conditions are equivalent
Let us assume (b). By Theorem 11, we have
This identity implies Mod (P g ) = Mod (Q g ). Let us assume that for some
Otherwise, I ≈ P J and so, diff P (I, J) = ∞. By Theorem 11,
The converse implication follows by symmetry. Thus, (c) holds.
Finally, we assume (c) and prove (a). To this end, we show that the conditions (1)-(4) of Theorem 11 hold. Directly from the assumptions, we have that condition (1) holds. Condition (2) follows from the general fact that for every optimization problems P and Q, and every set
To prove the condition (3), let us assume that I, J ∈ Mod (P g ) and that diff P (I, J) > 1. Since P is simple, I ≈ P J. Thus, I ≈ Q J and, consequently, diff
Complexity
In this section, we study the problems of deciding the various notions of strong equivalence. Typically the comparisons between sets of outcomes in the characterizations determine the respective complexity. We start with results concerning strong sel-equivalence.
Theorem 15
Given optimization problems P and Q, deciding P ≡ s Q is co-NP-complete in case of CO-problems and Π P 2 -complete in case of ASO-problems. Proof. [Sketch] For membership, one can show that given a pair of interpretations I, J it can be verified in polynomial time (for CO-problems) or in polynomial time using an NP oracle (for ASO-problems) whether they form a witness for the complement of the conditions stated in Corollary 4. The main observation is that model checking is polynomial for the classical semantics, but co-NPcomplete for the equilibrium semantics (Theorem 8 of (Pearce, Tompits, and Woltran 2009)).
Hardness follows from considering the equivalence problem for optimizations problems with empty selectors, which is known to be co-NP-hard (for classical semantics) and Π P 2 -hard (for equilibrium semantics, Theorem 11 of (Pearce, Tompits, and Woltran 2009)). ✷ For the ranked case, we observe an increase in complexity, which can be explained by the characterization given in Theorem 2: Instead of outcome checking, this characterization involves optimal outcome checking, which is more difficult (unless the polynomial hierarchy collapses).
Theorem 16 Given optimization problems P and Q and a rank interval
-complete in case of CO-problems and Π P 3 -complete in case of ASOproblems. Proof.
[Sketch] The membership part essentially follows the same arguments as the proof of Theorem 15, but here the problem of checking I ∈ π(P <i ) is in co-NP for COproblems and in Π P 2 for ASO-problems. For the hardness part, we reduce the following problem to sel-equivalence of CO-problems: Given two propositional theories S and T , decide whether they possess the same minimal models. This problem is known to be Π P 2 -complete (e.g. Theorem 6.15 (Eiter, Fink, and Woltran 2007)), and the problem remains hard if S and T are in NNF given over the same alphabet. We adapt a construction used in (Brewka, Niemelä, and Truszczyński 2011) , and given a theory T (over atoms in U ) we construct a CO problem P T where
and T [¬u/u ′ ] stands for the theory resulting from replacing all ¬u by u ′ in T . The elements in π(P T ) are in a one-to-one correspondence to the minimal models of T . For theories S and T over U it follows that S and T have the same minimal models if and only if P S ≡ s,≥2 P T . Concerning the hardness part for ASO problems, we use the following problem: given two open QBFs ∀Y φ(X, Y ), ∀Y ψ(X, Y ), do they possess the same minimal models. This problem is Π P 3 -hard (see Lemma 27 in Appendix A). For φ(X, Y ), we construct P φ as follows:
where φ[¬z/z ′ ] stands for the formula obtained by replacing all ¬z by z ′ in φ(X, Y ). The elements in π(P φ ) are in a one-to-one correspondence to the minimal models of ∀Y φ(X, Y ). For φ and ψ over X ∪ Y we get that ∀Y φ(X, Y ) and ∀Y ψ(X, Y ) have the same minimal models if and only if P φ ≡ s,≥2 P ψ . ✷
In Theorem 16 the rank interval [i, j] is given in input. When fixing the interval, the hardness results still hold, provided that i > 1. In fact, the critical condition in Corollary 3 is π(P <i ) = π(Q <i ); for rank intervals [1, j], the selectors become empty and the condition is reduced to µ(P ) = µ(Q), which is easier to decide.
The remaining problems are all in co-NP. For strong genequivalence, completeness follows directly from Theorem 9 and co-NP-completeness of deciding strong equivalence between two propositional theories (for both semantics).
Theorem 17 Given two CO (ASO, respectively) problems
Finally, for the combined case the hardness result follows from Theorem 11 and co-NP-completeness of deciding strong equivalence of propositional theories.
Theorem 18 Given ranked CO (ASO, respectively) problems P and Q, and rank interval
By construction, all hardness results hold already for simple optimization problem.
Discussion
We introduced the formalism of optimization problems, generalizing the principles of ASO programs, in particular, the separation of hard and soft constraints (Brewka, Niemelä, and Truszczyński 2003) . We focused on two important specializations of optimization problems: CO problems and ASO problems. We studied various forms of strong equivalence for these classes of optimization problems, depending on what contexts are considered. Specifically, we considered the following cases: new preference information is added, but the hard constraints remain unchanged (strong sel-equivalence); hard constraints are added but preferences remain unchanged (strong genequivalence); both hard constraints and preferences can be added (strong equivalence). To the best of our knowledge, this natural classification of equivalences in preference formalisms has not been studied yet. In certain cases some of these notions coincide (Theorem 12) but this is no longer true when the underlying semantics is changed or ranks in contexts are restricted.
In fact, we established characterizations of all these notions of strong equivalence. They exhibit strong similarities. The characterizations of strong sel-equivalence for CO and ASO problems in Theorem 2 are precisely the same, mirroring the fact that generators are not subject to change. Theorem 9 concerns strong gen-equivalence for CO and ASO problems. In each case, the characterizations consist of two requirements: the strong equivalence of generators, and the equality of the strict preference relations restricted to the class of models of the generators. The only difference comes from the fact that strong equivalence for classical and the equilibrium-model semantics have different characterizations. Theorem 11 which concerns the combined case of strong equivalence also does not differentiate between CO and ASO problems other than implicitly (as before, the conditions of strong equivalence are different for the two semantics). Moreover, the characterizations given arise in a certain systematic way from those given in Theorems 2 and 9. This being the case in each of the different semantics we used strongly suggests that there are some abstract principles at play here. We are currently pursuing this direction, conjecturing that this is an inherent feature of preference formalisms with separation of hard and soft constraints.
Our results give rise to problem rewriting methods that transform optimization problems into strongly equivalent ones. We provided two simple examples illustrating that application of our results in Example 6 and Corollary 8. Similar examples can be constructed for our results concerning strong gen-equivalence and (combined) strong equivalence. A more systematic study of optimization problem rewriting rules that result in strongly equivalent problems will be a subject of future work.
Finally, we established the complexity of deciding whether optimization problems are strongly equivalent. Notably, in the general case of strong (combined) equivalence this problem remains in co-NP for both CO and ASO problem. It is strong sel-equivalence that is computationally hardest to test (in case of ASO problems, Π P 3 -hard). It is so, as the concept depends of properties of outcomes that are optimal with respect to rules of ranks less than i, while in other cases all models have to be considered. Testing optimality is harder than testing for being a model, explaining the results we obtained. 
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Appendix A: Useful Lemmas
We provide here several lemmas that we use later in the proofs of the results discussed in the main body of the paper. The first property follows immediately from the definitions.
Lemma 19 Let P and Q be optimization problems with >
. Then, π(P ) = π(Q). The next lemma characterizes the relation > P ∪Q for ranked optimization problems P and Q. We recall that diff P (I, J) is the largest k such that I ≈ P <k J, where in addition diff P (I, J) = ∞, if I ≈ P <k J, for every k.
Lemma 20 Let P and Q be optimization problems, and I, J be interpretations. Then, I > P ∪Q J holds if and only if one of the following conditions holds:
Proof. The "if" direction is evident. To prove the "only-if" direction, we note that the cases diff
and diff P (I, J) > diff Q (I, J) are obvious, too. Thus, let us assume diff P (I, J) = diff Q (I, J) = i. Clearly, i < ∞ (otherwise, I ≈ P ∪Q J, contrary to the assumption). It follows that for every rule r ∈ P s ∪ Q s of rank less than i, v I (r) = v J (r). Next, for every r ∈ P s ∪ Q s of rank i, v I (r) ≥ v J (r). Finally, there are rules r ∈ P s and r ′ ∈ Q s , each of rank i such that v I (r) = v J (r) and v I (r
. Thus, I > P J and I > Q J, as needed. ✷
Lemma 21
For every optimization problem P and every i ≥ 1, π(P <i ) ⊇ π(P ).
Proof. Let us assume that I / ∈ π(P <i ). Then, there is an interpretation J ∈ µ(P <i ) such that J > P<i I. Thus, there is a rule r ∈ P s <i , say of rank j, such that (i) v J (r) < v I (r); (ii) for every r ′ ∈ P s <i with the rank j, v J (r ′ ) ≤ v J (r ′ ); and (iii) for every r ′ ∈ P s <i with rank less then j, v J (r ′ ) = v I (r ′ ). We note that, since µ(P <i ) = µ(P ), J ∈ µ(P ). Moreover, j < i and so the sets of rules with ranks less than or equal to j in P s and P s <i coincide. Thus, J > P I follows and, consequently, I / ∈ π(P ). ✷
We give the next two lemmas without proofs, as they are easy consequences of results by Ferraris [2005] and Ferraris and Lifschitz [2005] .
Lemma 22 Let P be a theory, I an interpretation, and let
Lemma 23 Let P be a theory, I, J two of its (classical) models such that I = J, and let
Lemma 24 Let P be an optimization problem, I ∈ π(P <j ), where j ≥ 1, and let
2. for every J such that J = I and
Proof. When proving (1), to simplify the notation, we write R for R j [I] . Since I ∈ π(P <j ), I ∈ µ(P ). Clearly, µ(P ∪ R) = µ(P ) and so, I ∈ µ(P ∪ R). To show that I ∈ π(P ∪ R), let us consider an arbitrary interpretation J ∈ µ(P ∪ R) and assume that J > P ∪R I. In particular, J = I and so, diff R (I, J) = j. If diff P (I, J) < j, then diff P ∪R (I, J) < j. Consequently, J > (P ∪R)<j I. Since all rules in R are of rank j, it follows that J > P<j I, a contradiction with the fact that I ∈ π(P <j ). Thus, diff
The assertion (2) (1) is evident. Moreover, combined with I > P J, it yields I > P ∪R ′ J. Thus, the assertion (2) holds.
Proof. To simplify the notation, we write
To prove the assertion (3), we consider an interpretation K that is different from I and from J, and we show that there is a rule r ∈ R ′ such that v K (r) = 2.
Let us consider a ∈ I ∩ J. The rule r a = a > ⊤ j ← belongs to R ′ . If v K (r a ) = 2, we are done. Thus, let us assume that for every a ∈ I ∩ J, v K (r a ) = 1, where r a = a > ⊤ j ←. Consequently, for every a ∈ I ∩ J, a ∈ K, that is, I ∩ J ⊆ K. Taking into account rules ¬a > ⊤ j ←, with a ∈ U \ (I ∪ J) and reasoning in the same way, we show that K ⊆ I ∪ J.
Let us assume that (I ∩ J) ⊂ K ⊂ (I ∪ J) holds. Then, there is a ∈ I ∪ J such that a / ∈ K. Without loss of generality we can assume that a ∈ I.
where r is the corresponding rule from R ′ . Thus, only two possibilities for K remain: K = I ∩J and K = I ∪ J. It follows that I \ J = ∅ (otherwise, I = K) and J \ I = ∅ (otherwise, J = K). Let a ′ ∈ I \ J and
To prove the assertion (4), we note first that (1) and I > P J together imply that I > P ∪R ′ J. Next, we note that
If diff P (J, K) ≥ j, then the property proved above implies
Since K is an arbitrary interpretation different from I and J, and since I >
We also note a property here that allows us to infer the strong sel-equivalence of two problems treated as CO problems from the strong sel-equivalence the these problems when treated as ASO problems (and conversely). The property relies on the fact that changing selectors only does not affect the class of outcomes. The proof is simple and we omit it.
Lemma 26 Let P and Q be optimization problems such that The final results in this section will be useful for the complexity results.
Lemma 27 Deciding whether open QBFs
Proof. We show the result by a reduction from the Π P 3 -hard problem of deciding satisfiability for QBFs of the form ∀Z∃X∀Y χ. Let Φ be a QBF of such a form and consider the following formulas, where Z ′ = {z ′ | z ∈ Z}, u and v are fresh atoms:
Hence, the only difference between φ compared to ψ is that we use u and v interchangably. Also note that the only point of including the conjuncts v∨¬v and u∨¬u is to have occurrences of u and v in both φ and ψ. We show that ∀Y φ(U, Y ) and ∀Y ψ(U, Y ) have the same minimal models (with open variables U = Z ∪ Z ′ ∪ X ∪ {u, v}) if and only if Φ is true. Only-if direction: Assume Φ is false. Then, there exists an assignment I ⊆ Z, such that for all assignments to X, ∀Y χ is false. We show that M u = I ∪ (Z \ I) ′ ∪ X ∪ {u} is a minimal model of ∀Y φ. Indeed, it is a model of ∀Y φ and by the conjunction z∈Z (z ↔ ¬z ′ ) the only candidates for models N ⊂ M u of ∀Y φ are of the form I ∪(Z \I) ′ ∪J with J ⊂ X ∪ {u}, but then ∀Y χ (note that we can safely shift in φ the quantifier ∀Y in front of χ since χ hosts the only occurrences of atoms from Y in φ) would be true under I ∪ (J \ {u}), a contradiction to our assumption. By essentially the same arguments, it can be shown that M v = I ∪ (Z \ I) ′ ∪ X ∪ {v} is a minimal model of ∀Y ψ. Since M u = M v we have shown that ∀Y φ and ∀Y ψ have different minimal models.
If-direction: Suppose ∀Y φ and ∀Y ψ have different minimal models. The only relevant difference between φ and ψ is the conjunction ( x∈X x ∧ u) in φ, resp. ( x∈X x ∧ v) in ψ. We can conclude that the different minimal models are
′ ∪ X ∪ {v} being a minimal model of ∀Y ψ. Let us consider M u . Since it is a minimal model, there is no proper subset of M u which is a model of ∀Y φ, in particular there is no N ⊂ X ∪ {u} such that I ∪ (Z \ I) ′ ∪ N is a model of ∀Y φ. From this we observe that, for no such N , I ∪ (Z \ I) ′ ∪ N is a model of ( x∈X x ∧ u) ∨ χ , which implies that for no such N ,
is a model of ∀Y χ. But then Φ is false, since we have found an interpretation I ⊆ Z such that for no J ⊆ X, ∀Y χ is true under I ∪ J. ✷ Lemma 28 Given a ranked preference rule r, and an interpretation I, calculating v I (r) can be done in polynomial time.
Proof. Initialize a variable x with 1. Starting from i = 1 check whether I |= hd i (r), and if so, set x to i and halt; otherwise increment i and continue checking; if no more heads exist in r, halt. Each of the checks is a model checking task for a propositional formula and hence in polynomial time. Upon halting, x is equal to v I (r). ✷
Lemma 29
Given an optimization problem P and two interpretations I, J, calculating diff P (I, J) can be done in polynomial time.
Proof. Initialize a variable x with ∞, scan the rules in P s and for each ranked preference rule r ∈ P s , determine whether v I (r) = v J (r) (in polynomial time due to Lemma 28). If so, set x to rank (r) if rank (r) < x. After having processed all rules, x is equal to diff P (I, J). ✷
Lemma 30
Given an optimization problem P , and two interpretations I, J, deciding whether I > P J can be done in polynomial time.
Proof. First, sort the rules in P s by their ranks. Starting from the lowest rank upwards, do the following for each rank i: Check for all rules of rank i whether v I (r) < v J (r) or v I (r) ≤ v J (r). If v I (r) < v J (r) holds at least for one rule and v I (r) ≤ v J (r) for all other rules of rank i, accept. If there are rules r and r ′ of the rank i such that
, reject. If all ranks have been processed, reject. By Lemma 28, all steps are doable in polynomial time. ✷ Lemma 31 Given a classical optimization problem P and an interpretation I, deciding whether I ∈ π(P ) is in co-NP.
Proof. We show that a witness J for the complementary problem (deciding whether I / ∈ π(P )) can be verified in polynomial time. If J = I, verify in polynomial time that I does not satisfy the propositional theory P g , which is well-known to be feasible in polynomial time. Otherwise, verify in polynomial time that J satisfies P g and that J > P I (both in polynomial time, the latter by Lemma 30). ✷ Lemma 32 Given an answer set optimization problem P and an interpretation I, deciding whether I ∈ π(P ) is in Σ P 2 . Proof. We show that a witness J for the complementary problem (deciding whether I / ∈ π(P )) can be verified in polynomial time using an NP oracle. If J = I, verify that I does not satisfy P g using the NP oracle. This is possible because answer-set checking is co-NP-complete (Theorem 8 of (Pearce, Tompits, and Woltran 2009)). Otherwise, verify using the NP oracle that J satisfies the propositional theory P g and that J > P I (in polynomial time by Lemma 30). ✷
Appendix B: Proofs
Theorem 2 For every ranked optimization problems P and Q, and every rank intervals [i, j], P ≡ s, [i,j] Q if and only if the following conditions hold:
. Thus, I ∈ π(P <i ). By assumption, it follows that I ∈ π(Q <i ). In particular, I ∈ µ(Q <i ) and, as µ(Q <i ) = µ(Q), I ∈ µ(Q). Since R g = ∅, we have I ∈ µ(Q ∪ R). To show that I ∈ π(Q ∪ R) we have to show that there is no J ∈ µ(Q ∪ R) such that J > Q∪R I. Let us assume to the contrary that such a J exists. By Lemma 20, there are three possibilities.
First, we assume that diff Q (I, J) < diff R (I, J) and J > Q I. The latter property implies diff Q (I, J) ≥ i (otherwise, we would have J > Q<i I, contrary to I ∈ π(Q <i )). In particular, we have I ≈ Q<i J and, since I ∈ π(Q <i ), it follows that J ∈ π(Q <i ). By (1), J ∈ π(P <i ). Thus, by (2),
, it follows that diff R (I, J) ≥ i and so, diff Q (I, J) > i. We recall that I ∈ π(Q <i ). Thus, J ∈ π(Q <i ) and, consequently,
Finally, let us assume that diff
Thus, diff Q (I, J) ≥ i and, since I ∈ π(Q <i ), J ∈ π(Q <i ). By (1) we have J ∈ π(P <i ) and, by (2), J > P I. Consequently, J > P ∪R I. In all cases we obtained J > P ∪R I, contrary to I ∈ π(P ∪ R), a contradiction.
(⇒) Let us assume that π(P <i ) = π(Q <i ). Without loss of generality, we can assume that there is I ∈ π(P <i ) \ π(Q <i ) and define R = (∅,
, where R i [I] is as in Lemma 24. By that lemma, I ∈ π(P ∪ R). On the other hand, since I / ∈ π(Q <i ) and R ∈ L s,=i U , I / ∈ π((Q ∪ R) <i ). By Lemma 21, I / ∈ π(Q ∪ R). Thus, P ≡ s,=i Q, contrary to the assumption.
It follows that π(P <i ) = π(Q <i ), that is, that the condition (1) holds. To prove the condition (2), let us consider interpretations I, J ∈ π(P <i ) such that I > P J.
. By Lemma 25(4), it follows that I > Q J. By symmetry, I > Q J implies I > P J and so, the condition (2) holds.
To prove the condition (3), let us assume that there are interpretations I and J that satisfy the assumptions but violate the corresponding conclusion. In what follows, we write p for diff P (I, J) and q for diff Q (I, J). Thus, we have p > i or q > i, p = q, and p ≤ j or q ≤ j. Without loss of generality, we can assume that p < q. It follows that p is finite and, consequently, that diff P (I, J) < ∞ and I = J. Moreover, i < q and p ≤ j.
Let us assume first that p < i. We take the problem R = (∅, R i [J]), where R i [J] is as specified in Lemma 24 and define P ′ = P ∪ R and Q ′ = Q ∪ R. Since I, J ∈ π(P <i ) we also have I, J ∈ π(Q <i ). By our assumptions, q > i. Thus, J ≈ Q ≤i I and, in particular, J ≥ Q ≤i I. We recall that I = J. Consequently, by the assertion (2) of Lemma 24 we have that J > Q ′ I. Since all rules in R have ranks i, we have I, J ∈ π(P ′ <i ) and diff
It follows that J >
. By the assertion (2) of Lemma 25, J > Q ′ I, a contradiction. Next, let p = i. Clearly, I > P J or J > P I. Without loss of generality, let us assume that J > P I.
, and let us define P ′ = P ∪ R ′ and Q ′ = Q ∪ R ′ . Since all rules in R ′ have ranks i, I, J ∈ π(P <i ) implies I, J ∈ π(P ′ <i ). Moreover, from J > P I it follows by Lemma 25(1) that J > 
On the other hand, we
It follows that p > i. To complete the proof of (3), we recall that p ≤ j. Clearly, I > P J or J > P I. Without loss of generality, let us assume that J > P I. Let R ′ = (∅, R i [I, J]), and let us define P ′ = P ∪ R ′ and Q ′ = Q ∪ R ′ . Let us assume that for some interpretation K / ∈ {I, J}, K > P ′ I. By Lemma 25(3), it follows that diff P ′ (I, K) < i. Thus, diff P (I, K) < i, a contradiction with I ∈ π(P <i ).
Thus, for every interpretation K / ∈ {I, J}, K > In addition, by Lemma 25(1), diff
and all rules in R have rank p, it follows that J > P ′ ∪R I.
Moreover, for every K / ∈ {I, J}, if diff
follows from Lemma 25(3) (and the definition of P ′ ). Thus, I ∈ π(P ′ ∪ R). On the other hand, we 
). ✷
Theorem 9
For every two CO (ASO, respectively) problems P and Q, P ≡ g Q if and only if P g and Q g are strongly equivalent (that is, Mod (P g ) = Mod (Q g ) for CO problems, and Mod HT (P g ) = Mod HT (Q g ) for ASO problems) and
The first assumption implies strong equivalence of the generators P g and Q g relative to the corresponding semantics (we recall that in the case of classical semantics, strong and standard equivalence coincide). It follows that for
(⇒) Let us assume that P g and Q g are not strongly equivalent. Then, there is a problem R ∈ L g U such that µ(P ∪R) = µ(Q ∪ R). Without loss of generality, we can assume that for some interpretation I,
where Π[I] is as defined in Lemma 22. By that lemma, µ(P ∪ R ∪ T ) = {I} and µ(Q ∪ R ∪ T ) = ∅. The former property implies that I is necessarily preferred, that is I ∈ π(P ∪ R ∪ T ), and the latter one implies that π(Q ∪ R ∪ T ) = ∅. This is a contradiction with the assumption that P ≡ g Q. Thus, P g and Q g are strongly equivalent, that is, Mod (P g ) = Mod (Q g ), in the case P and Q are CO problems, and Mod HT (P g ) = Mod HT (Q g ), in the case P and Q are ASO problems.
Since
), the identity holds in each of the two cases. Because of the equality, we will write M for both Mod (P g ) and Mod (Q g ). It remains to show that > P M => Q M . Towards a contradiction, let us assume that there are I, J ∈ M that are in exactly one of these two relations; without loss of generality we will assume that I > P J and I > Q J. The former identity implies, in particular, that I = J. Let T = (Π[I, J], ∅), where Π[I, J] is a theory defined in Lemma 23. By that lemma, µ(P ∪T ) = µ(Q ∪T ) = {I, J}. Clearly, J / ∈ π(P ∪T ) and J ∈ π(Q ∪ T ), contrary to our assumption that P ≡ g Q. ✷ 
) . Proof. The condition (1) is equivalent to the property that P g and Q g are strongly equivalent relative to the corresponding semantics. Using this observation, we will provide a single argument for the two versions of the assertion. (⇐) By Proposition 1, it suffices to prove that for every
By our comment above, we have that µ(P ∪ R) = µ(Q ∪ R) (we recall that µ(P ) denotes the set of outcomes of an optimization problem P ; µ(P ) = Mod (P g ) in the case of CO problems, and µ(P ) = AS (P g ) in the case of ASO problems). Moreover, for each type of problems, we also have
). Since all rules in R have rank at least i, by the condition (4) it follows that > (P ∪R)<i
. By Lemma 19, we have π((P ∪ R) <i ) = π((Q ∪ R) <i ) and so, the condition (1) of Theorem 2 holds for P ∪ R and Q ∪ R. Since π((P ∪ R) <i ) ⊆ µ(P ∪ R) ⊆ Mod (P g ), and since the corresponding inclusions hold for Q, too, the conditions (2)-(3) of this theorem for P and Q imply the conditions (2)-(3) from Theorem 2 for P ∪ R and Q ∪ R. Thus, by Theorem
Q. Then, P ≡ g Q follows and, by Theorem 9, implies the appropriate version of the condition (1). Since
), for each of the two versions of the assertion we have Mod (P g ) = Mod (Q g ). From now on in the proof, we write M for Mod (P g ) and, because of the equality, also for Mod (Q g ). Next, for interpretations I, J ∈ M , I = J, we define R = (Π[I, J], ∅), where Π[I, J] is as in Lemma 23. Let us define P 1 = P ∪ R and Q 1 = Q ∪ R. We have P 1 ≡ s, [i,j] Q 1 . Moreover, by Lemma 23, we also have that µ(P 1 ) = µ(Q 1 ) = {I, J}.
To prove the condition (4), let us assume that I > P<i J. It follows that I > P1 J (we recall that R contains no preference rules). Since µ(P 1 ) = {I, J}, J / ∈ π(P 1 ) and I ∈ π(P 1 ). By the assumption, J / ∈ π(Q 1 ). Since µ(Q 1 ) = {I, J}, we have that I > Q1 J. In particular, I ∈ π(Q 1 ). If diff Q (I, J) < i then, since R has no preference rules, I > Q<i J. Thus, let us assume that diff Q (I, J) ≥ i and let us define
, where
is as in Lemma 24. Since I > P<i J, R has no preference rules and all preference rules in R ′ have rank i, it follows that I >
It follows that I >
The converse implication follows by symmetry and so, the condition (4) holds.
To prove the condition (2), let us assume that I > P J. If diff P (I, J) < i, then I > P<i J and, by (4), I > Q<i J. Thus, I > Q J. Let us assume then that diff P (I, J) ≥ i. Since µ(P 1 ) = {I, J} and since I > P J implies I > P1 J, J / ∈ π(P 1 ). Thus, J / ∈ π(Q 1 ). Since µ(Q 1 ) = {I, J}, I > Q1 J and so, I > Q J. To prove the condition (3), without loss of generality we assume that i < diff P (I, J). Thus, we also have i < diff P1 (I, J) and that I, J ∈ π((P 1 ) <i ), the latter follows from the properties that µ(P 1 ) = {I, J} and that By Corollary 4, P ≡ s Q iff jointly (1) µ(P ) = µ(Q), (2) for every I, J ∈ µ(P ), diff P (I, J) = diff Q (I, J), and (3) > P µ(P ) = > Q µ(Q) . For membership, we consider the complementary problem, that is, deciding whether (a) µ(P ) = µ(Q), or (b) for some I, J ∈ µ(P ), diff
, and show that it is in NP for CO-problems and in Σ P 2 for ASO-problems. To do this, we show that a witness consisting of two interpretations can be verified in polynomial time, which in case of ASO-problems uses an NP oracle.
Consider therefore such a witness (I, J) of two interpretations. We first test for I ∈ µ(P ), I ∈ µ(Q), J ∈ µ(P ), and J ∈ µ(Q). In case of CO problems, each of these tests corresponds to model checking in classical propositional logic, which is well-known to be feasible in polynomial time. In case of ASP problems, we require one call each to an NP oracle, since answer-set checking is co-NP-complete (Theorem 8 of (Pearce, Tompits, and Woltran 2009)). If I ∈ µ(P )∆µ(Q) or J ∈ µ(P )∆µ(Q) (where ∆ denotes the symmetric difference), condition (a) is satisfied and the algorithm accepts. If I / ∈ µ(P ) ∩ µ(Q) or I / ∈ µ(P ) ∩ µ(Q), (I, J) is no witness for the satisfaction of any of the conditions (a), (b), (c), and the algorithm rejects.
At this point, both I, J are known to be in µ(P ) ∩ µ(Q). Next, compute p = diff P (I, J) and q = diff Q (I, J). By Lemma 29, this can be done in polynomial time. If p = q, condition (b) is satisfied and the algorithm accepts. Next, check for I > P J and I > Q J, which by Lemma 30 can be done in polynomial time. Since I, J ∈ µ(P ) ∩ µ(Q), we have in fact checked for I > P µ(P ) J and I > Q µ(Q) J. In case exactly one of the two holds, we accept, otherwise we reject. This yields a nondeterministic algorithm to decide P ≡ s Q which runs in polynomial time (in case of ASOproblem with access to an NP-oracle), and yields the desired upper bounds.
For hardness, we observe that in case of problems with empty selectors, ≡ s coincides with equivalence of propositional theories in case of CO-problems, and with equivalence of equilibrium theories in case of ASO-problems. The former is well known to be co-NP-hard, the latter is Π P 2 -hard (Theorem 11 of (Pearce, Tompits, and Woltran 2009)). ✷ Theorem 16 Given optimization problems P and Q and rank interval [i, j] Q<i) , and (3) for every I, J ∈ π(P <i ) such that i < diff
For membership, we consider the complementary problem, that is, deciding whether (a) π( Q<i) , or (c) for some I, J ∈ π(P <i ) such that i < diff P (I, J) or i < diff Q (I, J), diff P (I, J) = diff Q (I, J) and it holds that diff P (I, J) ≤ j or diff Q (I, J) ≤ j. We show that it is in Σ P 2 for COproblems and in Σ P 3 for ASO-problems by showing that a witness consisting of two interpretations can be verified in polynomial time, using an NP oracle when dealing with a CO-problem and a Σ P 2 oracle when dealing with an ASOproblem.
Consider a witness (I, J) of two interpretations. We first test for I ∈ π(P <i ), I ∈ π(Q <i ), J ∈ π(P <i ), and J ∈ π(Q <i ). By Lemma 31, this can be done by a call to an NP oracle for CO-problems, and by Lemma 32 it can be done by a call to a Σ P 2 oracle for ASO-problems. If I ∈ π(P <i )∆π(Q <i ) or J ∈ π(P <i )∆π(Q <i ) (∆ again denotes the symmetric difference), condition (a) is satisfied and the algorithm accepts. If I / ∈ π(P <i )∩π(Q <i ) or I / ∈ π(P <i )∩ π(Q <i ), (I, J) is no witness for the satisfaction of any of the conditions (a), (b), (c), and the algorithm rejects. Now both I, J are known to be in π(P <i ) ∩ π(Q <i ). Next, check for I > P J and I > Q J in polynomial time (by virtue of Lemma 30), which is equivalent to checks for I > P π(P<i) J and I > Q π(Q<i) J. In case exactly one of the two holds, we accept. Next, compute p = diff P (I, J) and q = diff Q (I, J). By Lemma 29, this can be done in polynomial time. Then verify that i < p or i < q, furthermore p = q, and p ≤ j or q ≤ j. If the verification succeeds, accept, otherwise reject. This yields a nondeterministic algorithm to decide P ≡ s Q which runs in polynomial time (in case of ASO-problem with access to an NP-oracle), and yields the desired upper bounds.
For the hardness part, we start with the case of CO problems. Therefore, we reduce the following problem to selequivalence: given two propositional theories S and T , do they possess the same minimal models. This problem is known to be Π P 2 -complete (for instance, equivalence for positive disjunctive programs is known to Π P 2 -complete, see e.g. Theorem 6.15 in (Eiter, Fink, and Woltran 2007) , which means testing whether two propositional formulas of a particular class have the same minimal models). The problem remains hard if S and T are in negation normal form over the same alphabet. Given a theory T we construct a CO problem P T such that the elements in π(P T ) are in a one-to-one correspondence to the minimal models of T . We adapt a construction used in (Brewka, Niemelä, and Truszczyński 2011). Given T (over atoms U ), we construct P
where T [¬u/u ′ ] stands for replacing all ¬u by u ′ in T , and s φ of the form u ′ > u where u ∈ M \ N we obtain v N + (r) = 1 < 2 = v M + (r) and for all other rules r ′ in P s φ we have v N + (r) = 2 = v M + (r), hence N + > P φ M + , contradicting M + ∈ π(P φ ). Assume next that M is a minimal model of ∀Y φ(X, Y ). Then M + ∈ µ(P φ ) and for all N + ∈ µ(P φ ) we can show that N + > P φ M + does not hold (implying M + ∈ π(P φ )): If N + > P φ M + would hold, then v N + (r) < v M + (r) for at least one r ∈ P s φ and v N + (r) ≤ v M + (r) for all r ′ ∈ P s φ . This of course implies N M and since N satisfies ∀Y φ(X, Y ) it contradicts the assumption that M is a minimal model of ∀Y φ(X, Y ). We thus have that M + ∈ π(P φ ) if and only if M is a minimal model of ∀Y φ(X, Y ). Moreover, for φ and ψ over X ∪ Y it follows that ∀Y φ(X, Y ) and ∀Y ψ(X, Y ) have the same minimal models if and only if P φ ≡ s,≥2 P ψ . Indeed, for any R ∈ L s,≥2 U it is easy to verify that π(P φ ) = π(P φ ∪ R) and π(P ψ ) = π(P ψ ∪ R), since for no I, J ∈ µ(P φ ) it holds that I ≈ P φ J and neither for any I, J ∈ µ(P ψ ) it holds that I ≈ P ψ J. ✷
Theorem 17
Given two CO (ASO, respectively) problems P and Q, deciding P ≡ g Q is co-NP-complete.
Proof.
By Theorem 9, P ≡ g Q if and only if > P Mod(P g ) = > Q Mod(Q g ) and for CO problems Mod (P g ) = Mod (Q g ) and for ASO problems Mod HT (P g ) = Mod HT (Q g ).
Hardness immediately follows from co-NP-completeness of testing Mod (P g ) = Mod (Q g ) and Mod HT (P g ) = Mod HT (Q g ) (Lin 2002). Membership can be shown by verifying a witness (I, J) for the complementary problem (composed of two interpretations) in polynomial time: Check in polynomial time whether I ∈ Mod (P g ), I ∈ Mod (Q g ), J ∈ Mod (P g ), J ∈ Mod (Q g ). If all checks succeed, check for I > P Mod(P g ) J and I > Q Mod(Q g ) J (by Lemma 30 I > P J and I > Q J can be checked in polynomial time and we have I, J ∈ Mod (P g ) and I, J ∈ Mod (Q g )); if one of them succeeds and the other does not, accept; otherwise, for CO problems test for I ∈ Mod (P g )∆Mod (Q g ) or J ∈ Mod (P g )∆Mod (Q g ) (∆ again denotes the symmetric difference) and accept if so, reject otherwise; for ASO problems, check for I, J |= HT P g and I, J |= HT Q g (in polynomial time); if one of them succeeds and the other does not, accept, reject otherwise. ✷
Theorem 18
Given ranked CO (ASO, respectively) problems P and Q, and rank interval [i, j] , deciding P ≡ s, [i,j] g Q is co-NP-complete.
Proof.
By Theorem 11, P ≡ s,[i,j] g Q if and only if jointly (1) P g and Q g are strongly equivalent (that is, Mod (P g ) = Mod (Q g ) for CO problems, and Mod HT (P g ) = Mod HT (Q g ) for ASO problems), (2) > P Mod(P g ) = > Q Mod(Q g ) , (3) for every I, J ∈ Mod (P g ) such that i < diff P (I, J) or i < diff Q (I, J), diff P (I, J) = diff Q (I, J) or both diff P (I, J) > j and diff Q (I, J) > j, and (4) >
P<i
Mod(P g ) = > Q<i Mod(Q g ) . For membership, we consider the complementary problem, that is, deciding whether (a) P g and Q g are not strongly equivalent (that is, Mod (P g ) = Mod (Q g ) for CO problems, and Mod HT (P g ) = Mod HT (Q g ) for ASO problems), or (b) > P Mod(P g ) = > Q Mod(Q g ) , (c) for some I, J ∈ Mod (P g ) such that i < diff P (I, J) or i < diff Q (I, J), diff P (I, J) = diff Q (I, J) and it holds that diff P (I, J) ≤ j or diff Q (I, J) ≤ j, and (d) >
Mod(P g ) = > Q<i Mod(Q g ) . As in previous proofs, we will give a polynomial time algorithm for verifying a witness consisting of two interpretations.
Consider therefore such a witness (I, J) of two interpretations. We first test for I ∈ Mod (P g ), I ∈ Mod (Q g ), J ∈ Mod (P g ), and J ∈ Mod (Q g ). For CO problems, if I ∈ Mod (P g )∆Mod (Q g ) or J ∈ Mod (P g )∆Mod (Q g ) (where ∆ again denotes the symmetric difference), then accept immediately. For ASO problems, test for I, J |= HT P g and I, J |= HT Q g (in polynomial time), and if only one of them holds, then accept. If I / ∈ Mod (P g )∩Mod (Q g ) or J ∈ Mod (P g ) ∩ Mod (Q g ), reject. At this point, both I, J are known to be in Mod (P g ) ∩ Mod (Q g ). Thus, checking for I > P Mod(P g ) J and I > Q Mod(Q g ) J can be done in polynomial time, c.f. Lemma 30. In case exactly one of the two holds, we accept. Next, compute p = diff P (I, J) and q = diff Q (I, J). By Lemma 29, this can be done in polynomial time. Then verify that i < p or i < q, furthermore p = q, and p ≤ j or q ≤ j. If the verification succeeds, accept. Finally, check for I > P<i Mod(P g ) J and I > Q<i Mod(Q g ) J, which by Lemma 30 can be done in polynomial time. In case exactly one of the two holds, we accept, otherwise reject.
Hardness follows directly from co-NP-completeness of deciding equivalence between two propositional theories and of deciding strong equivalence between two equilibrium theories (Lin 2002) . ✷
